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For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human
animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans
share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties
(DA 427b6–14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24–6). With gods, humans share
a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17–
1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however,
coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26–9, EE 1219b28–31).
In this chapter, I show that a study of this cooperation helps to uncover some
distinctive aspects of human cognition and desire. Humans have a peculiarly
expanded non-rational perceptual and desiderative range. This difference in
sophistication is not merely a matter of enhanced discriminatory capacities:
humans also have the peculiar ability to exercise deliberative phantasia at will
and the peculiar ability to synthesise many phantasmata into one.1 Human
rational cognition, in turn, differs from divine cognition because it can be
hindered or supported by non-rational cognition. Human rational cognition
also involves peculiar abilities, including the ability to direct non-rational
cognition and non-rational affections by means of concentration and the
appropriate kinds of pleasures, pains, exhortations and reproofs.
Uncovering these peculiarities of human cognition is important in order
to solve a puzzle about the links between Aristotle’s psychology and his
ethics. Aristotle thinks that ethicists and political scientists should have
some knowledge of psychology and in particular of the rational part and
the non-rational part of the human soul (NE 1102a23–8). He also endorses
a “peculiarity criterion” according to which ethicists and political scientists
1Throughout this chapter I leave the term phantasia and its cognates untranslated.
Imagination is a fitting translation for deliberative phantasia, but the translation seems less
fitting in other contexts, including for example Aristotle’s view on phantasia’s involvement
in memory. The unity and the nature of Aristotle’s views on phantasia are debated
topics, see further Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, Schofield, ‘Aristotle on the
Imagination’, Frede, ‘The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’, Nussbaum, Aristotle’s
De Motu Animalium, essay 5, Caston, ‘Why Aristotle Needs Imagination’, Scheiter, ‘Images,
Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle’ and Johansen, The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul,
ch. 10.
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should only study aspects of the soul that are peculiarly human (NE 1102b4–
13, EE 1219b38–9). This raises the challenge to explain how the rational part
and the non-rational part of the human soul can have lot in common with the
souls of non-human beings and yet meet the peculiarity criterion advanced
in the ethical works. If my thesis in this chapter is correct, the rational and
non-rational parts of the human soul meet the peculiarity criterion because
they are built to cooperate.
Peculiarly Non-rational
In the ethical works, Aristotle divides the human soul into a rational and a non-
rational part. The non-rational part has two sub-parts. The first sub-part is
nutritive, “plantlike” and shared among all living things (NE 1102a35–b1 and
EE 1219b36–40). The second sub-part is the seat of cognitive and desiderative
faculties like appetitive desire and perception (EE 1219b23–5). Aristotle calls
it “the passionate part” (to pathe¯tikon, Pol. 1254b8) and “the desiderative part”
(to orektikon, NE 1102b30). Human and non-human animals share a number
of cognitive faculties and states including perception, phantasia, experience,
spirited desire (thumos), appetitive desire (epithumia) and memory. However,
unlike non-human animals, humans can think, reason and form beliefs.2 This
suggest that the non-rational part of the soul is shared between humans and
animals: it is desiderative and perceptual, but it cannot think.3
Despite the similarities with non-human animals, humans are peculiar
because their non-rational cognition and desire cooperate with the rational
part and with logos.4 To give a closer look at this peculiarity, let us start with
human perception. For Aristotle, both human and non-human animals can
perceive things as being in a certain way. For example, we can perceive fire
as hot, or food as near and available, or an object as white.5
2SeeMet. 980a28–b28 for perception, phantasia, memory and experience. See DA 414a29–
b19 for perception and appetitive desire. See DA 428a20-2, DA 433a9–12, DA 433b27–30,
DA 433b27–30, DA 434a6–9 for the difficult case of phantasia. For appetitive and spirited
desire see NE 1111b10–13 and EE 1225b24–6. See DA 427b7–27 on non-human animals
lacking thought.
3For this view, I follow Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good, ch. 4.2 and Moss,
‘Aristotle’s Ethical Psychology’ contra Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 26–30.
4NE 1102b31–5, EE 1219b38–1220a1. I tentatively translate logos with “reason” when
it is used to indicate the difference between humans and animals. On the difficulties of
translating logos in Aristotle’s moral psychology see Moss, ‘Right Reason in Plato and
Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos’.
5See Met. 981b10–12, DA 418a7–25, DA 428b18–29, NE 1118a20–3. For a similar view
see Moss, ‘Aristotle’s Ethical Psychology’, pp. 130–131. These passages and the possibility
of animal discriminative perception have been discussed by Sorabji, Animal Minds and
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Different animals have different perceptual ranges. Often, the cooperation
between perception and other cognitive faculties is responsible for the expan-
sion of a certain animal’s perceptual range. For example, at Met. 980a28–b25,
every animal has perception and only some have memory. Those who have
memory are more able to learn (mathe¯tiko¯tera) and can gain a little experience
(empeiria). Gaining experience and being able to learn involve, among other
things, being able to discriminate a wider range of properties. For exam-
ple, some animals are better learners because they discriminate perceptually
differences in articulated sounds:
Some [sc. animals] also have a share in both some kind of teaching
and learning, some from each other, some also from humans, in
so far as they have a share in hearing not only sounds, but also in
distinguishing perceptually (diaisthanetai) the difference between
signals (se¯meio¯n).6
Some animals are capable of recognising perceptually different signals (se¯meia).
This contributes to their ability to learn and, presumably, it is in part
due to the fact that they have better memories. Aristotle’s studies on non-
human animal behaviour corroborate the suggestion that memory enlarges
the perceptual range of some non-human animals: at HA 605a7–9, horses
discriminate between horses they already fought and horses they did not fight
yet; at HA 612a3–16, goats and dogs recognise and remember which herbs
induce vomiting or cure wounds and eat them when needed.
Human and non-human perception’s discriminative range can be expanded
by the cooperation with different non-rational faculties and states. In the
human case, perception’s discriminative range can also be expanded by the
cooperation with rational cognition. In Aristotle’s psychological works, we find
various examples of non-rational perceptual cognition that is only available
to rational creatures because they are rational. At the very beginning of On
Perception, there is a description of the human ability to hear speech (logos):
Incidentally, hearing contributes for the most part to wisdom.
Speech (logos) is the cause of learning because it is audible, not in
Human Morals, pp. 17–20, 30–40, Cashdollar, ‘Aristotle’s Account of Incidental Perception’,
pp. 158 ff, Modrak, Aristotle: The Power of Perception, p. 70 ff. Everson, Aristotle on
Perception, Ch. 5.
6῎Ενια δὲ κοινωνεῖ τινὸς ἅμα καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας, τὰ μὲν piαρ’ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ
καὶ piαρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώpiων, ὅσαpiερ ἀκοῆς μετέχει, μὴ μόνον ὅσα τῶν ψόφων, ἀλλ’ ὅσα καὶ τῶν
σημείων διαισθάνεται τὰς διαφοράς. HA 608a18–22. Translations of the History of Animals
are based, sometimes loosely, on Thompson, History of Animals.
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its own right but incidentally: for it is made of names, and every
name is a symbol (symbolon).7
Speech is audible, though only incidentally, therefore it contributes to learning.
The ability to hear names and symbols, and thereby speech, seems to be the
peculiarly human version of the non-human animal ability to hear signals.
Aristotle tells us little about the distinction between signals and symbols
and he even uses the words interchangeably in some passages (De Int. 16a4–
9).8 However, in this passage, he implies that speech is audible because it
is composed of symbols (names) which can be discriminated perceptually.
The immediately preceding lines, On Perception 437a10–12, can be taken
to confirm this suggestion: Aristotle argues that hearing informs us both
of differences in sound (psophos) and of differences in voice (phone¯). The
differences in articulated voice are the kind of differences one needs to grasp
in order to be able to discriminate speech and symbols perceptually. On this
interpretation, the difference between perceptual discrimination of signals and
perceptual discrimination of symbols is relatively small. In order to perceive
some sound as a symbol and not merely as a signal, the hearer must possess
not only good memory and perhaps experience, but also logos and thought.
If this is right, names and symbols are “incidental perceptibles” like
signals. At DA 418a7–25 and DA 428b18–29, Aristotle distinguishes between
proper (idia) perceptibles like colours, sounds and flavours; common (koina)
perceptibles like motion, rest, number, shape and size; and incidental (kata
sumbebe¯kos) perceptibles like “Diares’ son”. Symbols and speech are not the
only incidental perceptibles which can be grasped by rational animals alone:
grasping other incidental perceptibles, including the paradigmatic “son of
Diares” at DA 418a21, may require the perceiver to be a thinker.
One may object that these cases of incidental perception do not show
that humans have a broader perceptual range than non-human animals. All
they show is that humans can draw inferences from perceptual experience.
On this view, when we hear a name or a symbol, we intellectually infer from
perceptual evidence that it is a name or a symbol.9 Even if Aristotle tells us
7κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ piρὸς φρόνησιν ἡ ἀκοὴ piλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος. ὁ γὰρ λόγος
αἴτιός ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστὸς ὤν, οὐ καθ’ αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐξ ὀνομάτων
γὰρ σύγκειται, τῶν δ’ ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον σύμβολόν ἐστιν. On Perception 437a12–15. Trans-
lations of On Perception are loosely based on Beare and Ross, De Sensu et Sensibilibus. In
this context, the preferred translation of logos seems to be speech, given that Aristotle’s
point is that logos is audible.
8Much more would need to be said, of course, on the relevant difference between symbols
and signals. The difference that matters to me here is that only the former require logos in
order to be grasped.
9See e.g. Kahn, ‘Aristotle on Thinking’, pp. 367–8.
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disappointingly little on these matters, there is a persuasive response against
this objection. It would be hard to see why Aristotle counted these cases as
cases of incidental perception if what they in fact involve is drawing inferences
from perceptual experience. Stipulating that incidental perception is such
precisely because it involves inferences from perceptual experience would not
work either, because incidental perception is available to animals who cannot
draw inferences.10
Furthermore, the idea that thought and reason expand our non-rational
discriminative range is not limited to incidental perception, but extends to
common perception. When we see the sun as a foot wide (podiaios), we
are perceiving a common perceptible: size (megethos).11 As in Theaetetus
147d, here the foot is a technical measure unit, and technical measure units
can hardly be grasped by non-rational animals. The same applies to the
common perceptible number (arithmos). Perhaps, for Aristotle, animals can
discriminate between few and many. It is however unlikely that he believed
that discrete numbers feature in the content of their perceptions. Hence, the
possession of thought renders humans capable of discriminating perceptually
properties that the other animals cannot discriminate.
This analysis of the peculiarity of human perception can shed light on
other faculties or capacities we share with the other animals, including non-
rational desires (epithumia and thumos) and perceptual phantasia. Human
non-rational desires are peculiar for the same reasons human perception
is peculiar. In virtue of the expanded cognitive range peculiar to humans,
human non-rational desires can be for objects that go beyond the perceptual
range of non-rational animals.12 For example, humans can have non-rational
appetites for a specific kind of wine, or a specific type of seasoning in food.
Aristotle discusses appetites of this kind at NE 1118b8. He suggests that they
are different in different people and depend on the specific kinds of bodily
pleasures they indulge in. These desires lie below the threshold of rationality,
but they are peculiar to the human soul.
Similarly, it is plausible to think that human phantasia has a wider
cognitive range as a result of its cohabitation with reason and thought.
Since phantasia derives from our perceptual activities and phantasmata are
perceptual remnants, a peculiarly wide perceptual range is likely to produce
a peculiarly wide “phantastic” range.13
10See further Cashdollar, ‘Aristotle’s Account of Incidental Perception’. pp 158 ff.
11See DA 418a17 for size as a common perceptible. See DA 428b3–4 and Insomn. 458b28–9
for the perceptual appearance of the sun as a foot wide.
12See also Whiting, ‘Locomotive Soul: The Parts of Soul in Aristotle’s Scientific Works’,
pp. 188 ff. and Pearson, Aristotle on Desire, ch. 7.
13For phantasia and phantasmata as perceptual remnants, see DA 428b11–16, DA 428b30–
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The peculiarity of human phantasia is not limited to its expanded range.
De Anima also suggests that the cohabitation between phantasia, reason and
thought characteristic of humans gives rise to a special kind of phantasia.
Aristotle briefly describes it at DA 433b29–30 and DA 434a6–13, he calls
it either calculative (logistike¯) or deliberative (bouleutike¯) phantasia and he
argues that only humans have a share in it:
As we said, perceptual phantasia is found in the other animals,
but deliberative phantasia in the reasoning animals, for to decide
whether to do this or that is already the task of reasoning. And
it is necessary to measure by a single standard, inasmuch as one
pursues what is greater and can, consequently, make one out of
many phantasmata. And this is the reason why [phantasia] does
not seem to imply belief, it is because [phantasia] does not imply
a belief that result from syllogism, but belief implies phantasia.14
Clearly, deliberative phantasia is peculiarly human: non-rational animals do
not have it because they do not engage in deliberative calculations; divinities
lack phantasia in general and, a fortiori, deliberative phantasia because
phantasia requires perception and a body (DA 403a8–10).
It is harder to establish, however, whether or not deliberative phantasia
is capable of reasoning on its own. If we take the implicit subject at DA
434a11 to be phantasia, in this passage phantasia does not imply belief. This
chimes well with the thesis that phantasia is non-rational, for belief is a mark
of rationality (DA 427b7–27). However, here deliberative phantasia is also
related to the ability to combine or synthesise many phantasmata into a single
one, which may be taken to be an ability to engage in rational calculation.
A closer look at the role of phantasia in deliberation suggests that de-
liberative phantasia does not engage in autonomous rational calculation.15
Especially in De Anima iii. 7, Aristotle writes that phantasia functions simi-
larly to perception in deliberation:
430a9, Rhet. 1370a27–30.
14ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσpiερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑpiάρχει, ἡ δὲ
βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς piότερον γὰρ piράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον·
καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ piλειόνων φαντασμάτων
piοιεῖν. καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ
ἐκείνην· DA 434a5–11. The text and its interpretation are difficult. Line a10 is corrupted, I
retain αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην contra Cornford who has αὕτη δὲ κινεῖ. Contra Hicks, Aristotle De
Anima, p. 567, I follow Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 531 who takes the subject of
ἔχειν at a11 to be φαντασία and not τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα. For this reason, I do not follow Rodier in
taking a7 to a9 as a parenthetical remark.
15See Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good, pp. 144–151 on the very same point and
Lorenz, The Brute Within, p. 127.
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Phantasmata are similar to perceptions for the thinking soul, and
whenever one affirms or denies that something is good or bad, one
pursues or avoids16
The thinking part thinks some forms in phantasmata, and just as
in the context of perception (en ekeinois) what is to be pursued
and avoided is defined by it, so even outside perception, whenever
it is set over phantasmata, it is moved. ... Sometimes, on the basis
of phantasmata and thoughts in the soul, just as if seeing them,
it calculates and plans future things with reference to the things
that are present.17
In these passages, the role of phantasia in deliberation is analogous to the
role of perception in deliberation. Phantasmata are similar to perceptions
and, like perceptions, they help thinkers to define what to pursue and what to
avoid. The thinker’s deliberative faculties are set over (epi) phantasmata and
employ phantasmata to deliberate. Phantasia is employed in deliberation and
calculation, but it does not engage in independent calculation, deliberation
and reasoning. Hence, assuming that these passages describe deliberative
phantasia, deliberative phantasia is not an autonomous rational calculative
capacity. This account can be sustained by Aristotle’s remark that phantasia
comes about either through perception (dia aisthe¯seo¯s) or through thought
(dia noe¯seo¯s) at De Motu 702a19–20. If De Motu can be used to elucidate
the difference between perceptual phantasia and deliberative or calculative
phantasia, it implies that the two differ in origin, but not necessarily in their
reasoning capacities.18
Even if deliberative phantasia does not reason on its own, we can re-
construct some of its peculiarities from Aristotle’s succinct remarks on its
cooperation with thought. The first peculiar aspect of deliberative phantasia
is its connection with the ability to “make one out of many phantasmata”.
Even if we assume that this ability is not the same as our ability to engage in
rational calculation, it is hard to establish whether it pertains to phantasia or
16τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑpiάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν
φήσῃ ἢ ἀpiοφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει· DA 431a14–16
17τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ
τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐpiὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ᾖ, κινεῖται· ...
ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσpiερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ
μέλλοντα piρὸς τὰ piαρόντα· DA 431b2–8. I keep the same subject throughout and I take to
noe¯tikon to be a synecdoche for the thinker (see Hamlyn, Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 148,
cf. however Shields, De Anima, p. 64). This explains why Aristotle says that the thinking
part is moved: the thinking part is moved because the thinker is moved.
18See further Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, pp. 143–5.
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to thought. The passage suggests that making one out of many phantasmata is
the result of instrumental reasoning, because it is a consequence of our ability
to take the best course of action after having measured by a single standard.
On this view, the many phantasmata represent different means to an end,
and “making one out of them” amounts to picking a preferred phantasma,
thus choosing the best course of action among the available ones.19 If this is
all there is to this ability, it is a peculiar feature of deliberative thought and
not of deliberative phantasia.
The ability to make one out of many phantasmata may however be peculiar
to phantasia in other ways. Consider the ability to combine different perceptual
representations into a single complex representation. An ability of this kind
does not in itself involve deliberative reasoning, though it might be natural to
employ it while we deliberate. For example, we employ it when we picture to
ourselves in progressively more specific detail a course of action we are about
to engage in. This activity may follow a rational deliberation which employs a
single criterion to determine the best course of action. Imagine a deliberator
who decides to visit her friend having deliberated that it is the best way to
fulfil her goal to benefit a friend. If she has decided to walk to her friend’s
house, she might combine different particular phantasmata or appearances
(of herself travelling, of herself moving by foot, of herself moving on land)
into the unified appearance of herself travelling on land by foot. This unified
appearance encompasses all the practical details of the means she has chosen
to employ in order to achieve the goal of benefiting her friend. If the capacity
to make one out of many phantasmata is the capacity to put together unified
complex appearances, then it accompanies deliberation, but it is not itself a
kind of rational calculus.20
A second peculiar aspect of deliberative phantasia is that it is voluntary.
Since we generally engage in deliberation at will, deliberative phantasia is the
kind of phantasia we can exercise whenever we want to (hotan boulo¯metha, DA
427b15–24). Aristotle’s account of voluntary action in the ethical works sheds
light on voluntary mental acts like deliberation, recollection or phantasia. For
example, at EE 1225a30–2 some thoughts (dianoiai) are involuntary (or not
up to us) in the same way as actions are involuntary, which suggests that
other thoughts are voluntary (or up to us) in the same way as actions are
voluntary.21 Voluntary actions are, by definition, actions whose origin is in
19This option is discussed in Polansky, Aristotle’s De Anima, pp. 529–530.
20For this interpretation of the ability to make many phantasmata into one, see Philoponus’
commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima 592. 10–20 and 593. 1–4. On different possible
interpretations this unifying ability of phantasia see Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good,
pp. 147–9 and Lorenz, The Brute Within, p. 127.
21Corcilius, ‘How Are Episodes of Thought Initiated According to Aristotle?’ analyses
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an agent who is not ignorant about the particular circumstances in which
she is acting (EN 1111a22–4). Similarly, there are voluntary mental acts like
recollection of which we are aware and whose origin is in us. In this case, the
relevant contrast is with perception, whose origin appears to be in external
objects.22
This account of voluntary mental acts suggests that both human and
animals can exercise phantasia voluntarily. Unlike perception, phantasia does
not require external objects, because phantasmata are perceptual remnants
that our perceptual organs somehow retain (DA 429a5). Often, non-human
animal phantasia has an external cause and is therefore involuntary. It may
arise as a response to external perceptual stimuli which stir up and an ordered
series of phantasmata. For example, NE 1118a23 explains that lions only
appear to enjoy the sound of oxen, because what they really enjoy is eating
oxen. A plausible interpretation of this passage is that hearing oxen gives rise
to an associated phantasia of eating oxen which is then connected to pleasure.23
The source of this leonine phantasia is external and the phantasia is therefore
involuntary.24 In other circumstances, however, non-human phantasia has
internal sources, for example when its active exercise is embedded in an
animal’s voluntary and purposive behaviour. A thirsty animal may envisage
the route to the closest water pool even if no external stimulus has given rise
to the series of appearances associated with drinking.25 More controversially,
an animal confronted with a practical problem or obstacle may voluntary
envisage a way to overcome it.
However, there is something distinctive about the voluntary exercise of
phantasia involved in peculiarly human recollection and deliberation.26 When
we deliberate about something or try to recollect something, we do not merely
act for a purpose, but we set ourselves a particular kind of goal which in itself
voluntary thoughts as embedded in voluntary actions, for an independent analysis of the
voluntariness and autonomy of human thought see Wedin, ‘Aristotle on the Mechanics of
Thought’.
22On recollection originating from us or our soul and perception as originating from
something external see DA 408b15–18. On thought being up to us because its objects
are internal and perception not being up to us because its objects are external, see DA
417b23–5.
23See further Pearson, Aristotle on Desire, pp. 41–7, Lorenz, The Brute Within, pp. 128-
137 and Warren, The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists,
p. 15
24Dreams, too, may be explained in a similar fashion. They arise from perceptual changes
stored in the peripheral sense organs which travel to the heart and become active because
of sleep. See On Dreams 3 and Lorenz, The Brute Within, pp. 154-7.
25At De Motu 701a29–33 Aristotle describes a process of this sort, although it is not
obvious that he has in mind a voluntary exercise of phantasia.
26See HA 488b24–6 on deliberation and recollection as peculiarly human.
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involves the exercise of phantasia. Deliberation has the purpose of figuring
out and envisaging the most efficient means to our ends. Recollection has
the purpose of calling to mind a phantasia, it is a kind of rational search
for phantasmata stored in the soul.27 This suggests that humans exercise
phantasia for its own sake or for the sake of phantasia-involving thought.
Peculiarly human voluntary phantasiai are not oriented to external purposes,
they are not embedded in other kinds of purposive behaviour and they seem
specific to activities that involve speculation and research.28
This analysis of deliberative phantasia uncovers the peculiar voluntary
exercises of human phantasia. It also shows that human phantasia has the
distinctive ability to create a complex unified phantasma out of many distinct
phantasmata. If the discussion so far is correct, then while human perception,
desire and perceptual phantasia differ from their non-human counterparts in
discriminative degree, human deliberative phantasia can engage in activities
that are not accessible to non-human animals. A similar difference will arise
in the discussion of the peculiarity of human rational cognition and desire.
Human rational cognition is in a sense less sophisticated than divine cognition
because it requires the cooperation of non-rational cognition. However, humans
are capable of peculiar intellectual activities which have the specific purpose
of directing their non-rational part of the soul.
Peculiarly Rational
For Aristotle, the most important rational faculty is thought (nous). Thought
can take different forms, engage in different activities and be in different
states. These include practical knowledge, scientific knowledge, false or true
belief, reasoning and deliberating.29 Humans and gods have thought, but
non-human animals lack it.30
Aristotle also thinks that, just like cognitive faculties, desiderative fac-
27Mem 453a14–16 and the voluntarily constructed memory aids (mne¯monikoi) at DA
427b15–24.
28This kind of deliberate and voluntary mental activity may be the one that, according
to Warren, The Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists, p.
17, is involved in peculiarly human expectation and recollection.
29DA 427b6–14, Burnyeat, Aristotle’s Divine Intellect argues that nous shouldn’t be
identified with ordinary thinking. However, at DA 427b6–14 thought and thinking (nous
and noein) include high intellectual achievements and lower level reasoning. Burnyeat’s
argument may apply to Aristotle’s account of active nous in DA iii 5, but it cannot apply
to, e.g., DA iii 3 where nous includes false belief.
30On animals lacking thought, see inter alia DA 427b11–14. On thinking being shared
by humans and gods, see inter alia NE 1178b22–32.
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ulties can be rational. He discusses at least two types of rational desires:
decision (prohairesis) and wish (boule¯sis).31 Decision is peculiar to humans:
it is the result of deliberative thought oriented to action. Divinities neither
deliberate about action nor engage in action. Their only activity is intellectual
contemplation (theo¯ria).32 The gods, however, might have a share in rational
wish. After all, Aristotle says at Met. 1072b31–1073a3 that divine intellectual
contemplation is the best activity. Divinities, presumably, are aware that
contemplation is the best activity. This thought combined with the pleasure
of contemplation (NE 1177a22–7) may be the source of a rational wish to
continue to contemplate.33
As this preliminary analysis already suggests, there are different ways to
spot the differences between rational cognition and desire in humans and in
divinities. First, human rational cognition and desires are often directed at
something that is completely outside the concern of divine cognition: action.
Hence, for Aristotle, only humans engage in practical thought. Second, human
rational cognition is peculiar because it requires, at least most of the time,
the cooperation of phantasia.34 The cooperation between thought and non-
rational cognition will be at the centre of this chapter’s focus. However, some
aspects of this cooperation are relevant for practical cognition too.
Let us start from the idea that humans cannot think without the aid
of phantasia. The thesis that thought requires phantasia is endorsed, first,
for practical deliberative thought.35 At DA 431a14–16, Aristotle argues that
phantasmata necessarily accompany thought whenever a thinker is concerned
with assessing, pursuing and avoiding good or bad things. At DA 432a7–14,
the thesis is extended to theoretical thought. It applies more specifically
to thoughts about mathematical and physical objects. Similarly, at Mem.
449b30–450a9, Aristotle argues that we need phantasmata in order to think
31On decision see NE 1113a1–15, on wish see DA 432b4–7, Rhet. 1369a3–4, EE 1225b25–6.
Note, however, that at Pol. 1334b17–25, Aristotle attributes wish to the non-rational part
of the soul.
32NE 1178b8–25. See below for discussion and see Menn, ‘Aristotle’s Theology’ for an
introduction to Aristotle’s theology and divinities.
33A few lines before, at Met. 1072a26–30–, Aristotle argues that desires and wishes are
consequent on thinking that something is good.
34In the famously obscure De Anima iii 5, Aristotle discusses the divine agent intellect.
It is disputed whether or not humans have a share to the agent intellect. If they do,
presumably they can at least sometimes think without the aid of phantasmata. Precisely
because the agent intellect is strictly speaking divine and humans can at most have a
share in it, its study lies outside the scope of this chapter. See further Burnyeat, Aristotle’s
Divine Intellect, Caston, ‘Aristotle’s Two Intellects: A Modest Proposal’ and Cohoe, ‘When
and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata’.
35 At DA 403a8–10, the thesis that thought requires phantasia is suggested, but not
endorsed.
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about mathematical entities (quantities). He compares the use of phantasmata
in thought to the use of diagrams in geometry. Just as geometers make use of
only some of the relevant features of their diagrams, thinkers are concerned
with only some aspects of the phantasmata they put before their eyes as
they think. Nevertheless, both geometers and thinkers need diagrams and
phantasmata as aids to their proofing and reasoning.
Interpreters disagree about the exact function of phantasia in practical
and theoretical thinking: according to some, phantasia is necessary for all
thinking;36 according to others, it underlies only some exercises of our thinking
faculties;37 Even if the details of the collaboration between thought and
phantasia are hard to establish, this collaboration points towards at least
two peculiar aspects of human thought. First, human thought can be aided
by phantasia in particular and also by non-rational cognition in general.
This is already evident in the role assigned to phantasia in deliberation
and mathematical proofs. In addition, it is evident from the role played by
perception and phantasia in the ascent to the first principles of knowledge.
Both in Metaphysics i. 1 and in Posterior Analytics ii. 19, knowledge comes
about with the aid of non-rational perception, phantasia and memory.
The second peculiarly human effect of the collaboration between thought
and phantasia is that human thought can be hindered by phantasia, by
non-rational cognition and by certain bodily changes: at DA 408b18–28, the
decay of thought sometimes connected with old age is associated with bodily
changes brought about by disease and drunkenness; at DA 429a5–8 emotions,
sleep and illnesses can “cover over” or “cloud” thought; at Insomn. 460b3–
16, emotions like fear, love and anger prompt us to make mistakes in our
rational judgements. Aristotle does not say explicitly that the connection
between human thought and phantasia explains these impediments to thought.
However, he repeatedly emphasises the close connection between phantasia,
perception, bodily movements and affective reactions. On Dreams iii. (inter
alia) clearly shows that bodily movements and affections can influence and
impair the workings of phantasia. It is therefore plausible to believe that
Aristotle would have appealed to the fact that thought requires phantasia in
order to explain why it is hindered by non-rational psychophysical affections.38
A second peculiar aspect of human thought in its cooperation with non-
rational cognition is specific to the domain of practical thought. It concerns a
36Caston, ‘Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality’, Wedin, Mind and Imagination in
Aristotle, pp. 140–1, Modrak, Aristotle: The Power of Perception, pp. 122–3 and pp. 130–1.
37Cohoe, ‘When and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata’.
38Aquinas, for example, attributes to Aristotle precisely this view in his Sentencia
Libri de Sensu et de Sensatu, l. 2 n. 4 (cf. Cohoe, ‘When and Why Understanding Needs
Phantasmata’, fn. 45).
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peculiar activity of human rational cognition and not merely the necessary
support rational cognition requires from non-rational cognition. Practical
thought, for Aristotle, produces commands addressed to non-rational desires
and non-rational cognition. The production of these commands and their
effectiveness is important in the works on ethics and political science. At Pol.
1254b5–10, for example, the best possible condition of body and soul involves
the thinking part ruling the non-rational emotional and desiderative part.39
Elsewhere, the rational part persuades the non-rational part out of its bad
desires and it also governs action:
The [sc. non-rational part] with appetites and in general desires
shares [in reason] in a way, in so far as it both listens to it and
obeys it. This is the way in which we are said to listen to reason
from father and friends, as opposed to the way we [sc. give the
reason] in mathematics. The non-rational part also [sc. obeys and]
is persuaded in some way by reason, as is shown by admonition,
and by every sort of reproof and exhortation.40
In this passage, rational cognition engages with non-rational desires by means
of admonitions (nouthete¯seis), reproofs (epitime¯seis) and encouragements
(parakle¯seis). By analysing these kinds of commands, we can understand better
the peculiar strategies that enable the rational part to communicate with the
non-rational part. Reproofs (epitime¯seis) and exhortations (parakle¯seis) are
closely connected with the fine (to kalon) and the shameful (to aischron). At
NE 1180a5–12, exhortations are contrasted with punishments and correctives.
Unlike punishments, they give guidance to people who are already inclined
toward the fine and who already take pleasure in acting well. Exhortations
encourage these people to pursue the right things by characterising them as
fine.
Epitime¯seis, for Aristotle, can be of many different kinds. For example,
at Top. 161b19 an epitime¯sis is just an objection to a given argument. At
Rhet. 1355a27 and NE 1114a21–9, epitime¯seis are more like reproaches and
reproofs of one’s behaviour and dispositions. Unlike exhortations, reproofs are
associated with shame. At NE 1116a19–30 Aristotle argues that civic bravery
is often motivated by legal penalties (epitimiai) and reproaches (oneideis).
Reproaches inspire avoidance because they are shameful and not because
39At Pol. 1260a5–23 this idea is spelled out further. See also EE 1220a8-11 and EE
1220b5–6
40τὸ δ’ ἐpiιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει piως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ piει-
θαρχικόν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ piατρὸς καὶ τῶν φίλων φαμὲν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσpiερ τῶν
μαθηματικῶν. ὅτι δὲ piείθεταί piως ὑpiὸ λόγου τὸ ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ piᾶσα
ἐpiιτίμησίς τε καὶ piαράκλησις. NE 1102b31–1103a3.
13
they are painful like punishments (NE 1116a29). Reproofs and reproaches,
presumably, are shameful and not painful because they point out that one’s
moral faults are worthy of reprobation. Hence, reproofs are not only shameful
in themselves, but they also discourage us from desiring certain things by
characterising them as shameful.
Since they rely on the fine and the shameful, reproofs and exhortations
are effective with well habituated non-rational desires. As Myles Burnyeat
has argued,41 at NE 1128b15–20 shame is a semivirtue of learners. It prevents
young people from acting on their feelings (pathe¯) even if they tend to live
guided by feeling instead of reasoning. The recognition of shameful things
brought about by reproofs has a preventative role similar to the role of shame.
By characterising certain objects of desire as shameful, reproofs may lead
one’s non-rational part from being attracted to these pleasures to being
disgusted by them. Similarly to reproofs, exhortations can generate correct
non-rational desires because they encourage well habituated people to align
their non-rational desires with their general pursuit of the fine.
The human rational part has the peculiar capacity to understand the
fine and the shameful and to formulate effective commands on the basis of
this understanding. These commands have a purchase on the non-rational
part of the soul of an agent who has been trained to pursue the fine and
to avoid the shameful. One may nonetheless think that these exhortations
and reproofs are not the most suitable for the task. After all, non-rational
desires and passions respond first and foremost to pleasure and pain (NE
1179b11–16). They require habituation in order to respond to the fine and
the shameful. However, this objection looses force if we consider that the
pleasures and the toils of a rational part are unlikely to have an effect on
the non-rational part. The non-rational part, presumably, is unmoved by the
prospect of the pleasure of intellectual contemplation or by the prospect of
pleasure in virtuous action that gratifies the rational part.42
Clearly, the rational part can also exercise its ruling by bringing the
agent’s attention to prospective pains and pleasures, such as future rewards
and punishments. However, since these are external incentives, they are likely
to compel one’s action without diverting one’s desires. As we learn from
NE 1116b29–1117a3, military commanders employ these external incentives
to compel recalcitrant soldiers to withstand the pains of the battlefield
41Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to Be Good’.
42NE 1177a22–7, NE 1168b36–4 and NE 1169a11–13. See NE 1170a8–11 on the specific
kind of rational pleasure that completes one’s understanding and recognition of the fine.
For discussion of rational pleasures of this sort, see Coope, ‘Why Does Aristotle Think
That Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?’, pp. 155–160 and Warren, The
Pleasures of Reason in Plato, Aristotle, and the Hellenistic Hedonists.
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for the sake of avoiding the pains of punishments. Presumably, a soldier
threatened by her commander still desires to flee. However, she does not
act on her fear because of an even stronger aversion to punishment. For
this reason, Aristotle might have thought exhortations and reproofs to be
more appropriate persuasive measures for non-rational desires than external
rewards and punishments.
Exhortations and reproofs persuade without arguing or explaining. How-
ever, we have reason to think that reasoning too plays a role in the interaction
between parts of the soul. The persuasive role of reasoning emerges in Aris-
totle’s account of the appropriate use of admonition, i.e. the third kind of
command suitable for the non-rational part. At Pol. 1260b2–7, unlike other
kinds of commands, admonitions require some kind of explanation, or some
kind of conversational rational engagement (logos).43 This passage suggests
that the admonitions of the rational part of a wise person are more persuasive
than mere commands because they are accompanied by arguments and expla-
nations (logoi). A related point is made at NE 1150b22–5, where some people
can control their non-rational affections (pathe¯) by awakening themselves and
their rational calculation (proegeirantes heatous kai ton logismon). Aristotle
does not tell us much about the nature of this awakening. However, we can
suppose that it involves something like intellectual concentration and, perhaps,
an appropriate narrow focus of our intellectual attention. By concentrating
and by engaging in appropriate reasoning, we can prevent ourselves from
boiling up in non-rational anger or from being blinded by appetitive desires.
Aristotle’s successors attributed a similar role to intellectual concentration.
Simplicius, for example, discusses the ways in which awakening our attention
helps us to control our emotions and desires.44
If this is right, human rational cognition is peculiar because it can be
aided and hindered by non-rational cognition and desires. In addition, it has
the peculiar ability to govern non-rational desires by means of exhortations
and attention-directing arguments.
43Aristotle’s view discussion of admonition is embedded in a discussion of the correct
interaction between masters and slaves. While it is clearly unacceptable as an account of
human relationships, it can be used as an instructive analogy for the interaction between
parts of the soul. On the connection between admonition, teaching and reasoning see
inter alia Apology 26a3, Phaedo 94d5. For a case in which admonishing is contrasted to
reasoning, see however Soph. 229e4–230a3. The reference to admonitions (nouthete¯seis)
and the analogy between parents/masters and children/slaves are clearly reminiscent of
the description of the communication between parts of the soul in the Nicomachean Ethics.
44see Simplicius Commentary on Epictetus’ Handbook, esp. 114.50 ff. in the Dübner
edition (see also Brittain and Brennan, Simplicius: On Epictetus Handbook 27-53 , p.
92, comm. on ch. 33, lemma xliii). Cf. Epictetus On Attention (Peri Prosoche¯s) in his
Discourses, 4.12.
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Conclusion
At NE 1102a14–24, Aristotle argues that ethicists, political scientists and
anyone who seeks to learn about the human good and human happiness
should know something about the human soul. This means that the student
of ethics should have a certain degree of familiarity with psychology and
cognitive theory. Naturally, the student of ethics is not required to be familiar
with these sciences as wholes, but only with some relevant topics.45
In order to determine which topics in psychology are relevant for ethics and
political science, Aristotle employs a “peculiarity criterion”. At NE 1102a33–
b12 the nutritive part of the soul is not interesting for ethicists and political
scientists because it is not peculiarly human, but shared between humans,
plants and non-human animals. Although it is required for the functioning of
animal rational and non-rational cognition and desire, its operations are not
in any way changed or affected by rational and non-rational cognition and
desire (DA 414b28–415b8). According to some interpreters, the peculiarity
criterion also suggests that the cognitive and desiderative faculties we share
with non-human animals (e.g. perception) are not important for the study of
ethics.46 If this is right, however, our rational cognitive faculties (in particular
theoretical thought) do not matter for ethics either. After all, they are shared
between us and the gods.
On this view, the peculiarity criterion implies that neither rational cogni-
tion and desires nor non-rational cognition and desires are relevant for the
study of ethics. This implication is, of course, implausible. Aristotle deals
with perception and non-rational desires throughout the Nicomachean Ethics,
for example in his account of akrasia and practical wisdom in book vi and vii.
Similarly, he is concerned with an analysis of “divine” contemplation as the
highest possible achievement for a human life at the very end of the Nico-
machean Ethics. This suggests that we should either discard the peculiarity
criterion, or show that human non-rational and rational cognition are peculiar
in some sense.
In this chapter, I argued that humans are the only creatures in which
the rational part of the soul and the non-rational part of the soul interact.
By looking at this interaction, we can discover some peculiarities of the
45NE 1102a26–31. While it seems clear that a study of psychology can help us to elucidate
Aristotle’s ethics, it is hard to determine just how much psychology he expected a successful
ethicist or political scientist to know. On this question, see e.g. Shields, ‘The Science of the
Soul in Aristotle’s Ethics’ and Scott, Levels of Argument.
46See further Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion, pp. 26–31 and Fortenbaugh, Aristotle’s
Practical Side, p. 122 ff. My critique of this view follows Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent
Good, pp. 72–4.
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human cognitive and desiderative make-up. If my analysis is correct, these
peculiarities include: an expanded perceptual, phantastic and “desiderative”
range; voluntary and synthesising deliberative phantasia; the cooperation
between thought and phantasia; the rational ability to control desires by
means of exhortations, reproofs, pleasure, pain and intellectual concentration.
Aristotle develops a peculiarly human psychology even if he thinks that many
aspects of human cognition are shared between humans and other beings.
This is why human perception, thought, phantasia and desire are distinctive
enough to be relevant for the study of ethics.47
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